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Prior compensation literature documents and investigates trending practices in CEO incentive 
contracting by exploring the designs of individual contractual components (e.g., performance 
targets, pay type, etc.) rather than the overall contract structure. Using distance measures based on 
a comprehensive set of contract elements derived from firms’ proxy statements, I identify factors 
that are associated with a firm’s CEO compensation structure homogeneity, which describes the 
degree to which a firm’s CEO compensation structure is similar to industry practice. My study 
demonstrates that, consistent with the predictions under optimal contracting theory, a firm adopts 
a CEO compensation contract that is more similar to industry practice when the firm shares more 
common risks with its industry or when its owners share more common interests with its industry 
peers. However, the board of directors’ ability to communicate and obtain inside information, as 
well as the use of compensation consultants, also contributes to compensation homogeneity 
unexplained by general CEO/firm specific characteristics. Lastly, I find evidence that CEO 
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CEO compensation attracts much public attention, not only because CEOs are key corporate 
figures under the spotlight, but also because incentive contracting is an important corporate 
governance mechanism firm owners use to monitor and control (via corporate board) CEO 
behavior (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Prior literature suggests that efficient incentive contracts 
should be specifically tailored to firm and CEO characteristics. However, both academic research 
and business media observe a lack of variability in CEO incentive contracts (e.g., Mishel and 
Wolfe 2019; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Murphy 2013; Core, Guay and Larcker 2003; Nobel 2015). 
For instance, as shown in Figure 1, over 80% of the large U.S. companies use accounting metrics 
in their performance measures and around 90% companies that publicly disclose their CEO 
compensation use equity to award their CEOs. It is practically unclear which type of incentive 
contracts is more effective as various forces work together to shape the structure of an incentive 
contract. 
Therefore, in this study, I develop a measure of the similarity of a firm’s CEO compensation 
package to industry practice and find that contract homogeneity persists even after controlling for 
CEO- and firm-specific characteristics. Using this measure, I investigate potential causes of 
contract homogeneity and its impact on shareholders’ wealth.1  
Prior compensation literature purports that, to establish interest alignment, CEO 
compensation packages should tailor to shareholder preferences and match firm- and CEO-specific 
characteristics (e.g., David, Kochhar, and Levitas 1998; Murphy and Zabojnik 2004). Other than 
firm and CEO characteristics, the extant literature also proposes several factors that contribute to 
 
1 CEO compensation is usually composed of two to three incentive grants, each one of which contain contractual terms 
from different aspects, such as award type, vesting criterion, performance measure, etc. Together with the amount of 
fixed pay, a CEO compensation package represents the entire contract structure adopted in a CEO incentive contract.  




the contracting choices in CEO incentive contracts, including CEO labor market forces, social and 
political forces, and managerial power (Murphy and Zabojnik 2004; Jensen and Murphy 1990; 
Bebchuk and Fried 2003). Although these forces seem to influence CEO compensation structure 
from multi-aspects simultaneously, prior studies on CEO compensation structure largely focuses 
on specific key contract components of incentive contract (Core and Guay 1999; Bennett, Bettis, 
Goplan, and Milbourn 2017; Gong, Li, and Shin 2011; Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, and Kalpathy 2018). 
These key components include award types, performance measures, target types, and vesting 
criteria. Prior studies examine the determinants and impacts of these contractual components in 
isolation to shed light on our knowledge of CEO compensation structure. The issue here is an 
individual contractual component is likely to be interrelated with the other compensation 
components. For example, theoretically if a firm increases the use of equity awards, it is less likely 
to use performance-based incentives in its incentive contracts because equity itself is closely tied 
to firm performance. However, it is empirically unclear how specific design choice of a contractual 
element would interfere with the design of the overall contractual structure, which in turn 
influences managerial decisions. Therefore, although prior literature examining individual 
contractual components provides a great amount of inferential value, examining this issue from a 
more holistic point of view gives additional evidence to the overall compensation mosaic.  
In this study, I approach the issue of CEO compensation homogeneity from two broader 
aspects. First, instead of focusing on a specific contractual component in incentive contracts, I 
incorporate all the key contractual components and their interrelations. Examining overall contract 
structure is necessary because incentive contracts take effect on individuals as a whole piece. 
Second, rather than examining compensation similarity between two CEO compensation packages 
as done in the accounting literature (Gallani 2016), I examine the degree to which a firm’s entire 




CEO compensation package structure is similar to industry practice.2 The comparison between an 
individual CEO compensation package and industry practice can facilitate the understanding of 
trending practices in incentive contracting and further identify the key forces that shape the 
compensation structure we observe today.   
I measure CEO compensation homogeneity using the distance measures developed to 
evaluate between-object proximity, which is widely applied in numerous social science studies.3 I 
first list the five primary contractual dimensions that are identified as the key components of a 
compensation package in prior literature. These dimensions include: (1) award type; (2) vesting 
schedule; (3) performance measure; (4) target type; and (5) pay structure.4 Next, I extract and 
quantify the contract elements of CEO compensation from each one of the dimensions relying on 
the information provided via firms’ proxy statements. Using the contract elements from these 
dimensions as contracting metrics, I calculate pairwise distance among contracts of firms in the 
same fiscal year within each industry and construct an aggregated distance score for each firm-
year.5 I reverse this distance score and use it as a proxy for the level of homogeneity in a CEO 
compensation package in a firm-year. Based on a comprehensive set of contract components, this 
 
2 Gallani (2016) finds that the performance measures and pay mix in two firms’ CEO compensation packages are 
more similar to each other if these two firms are connected.  
3 The accounting studies that also use these techniques are Gallani (2016) and Brown (2017). Gallani (2016) has a 
similar setting, in which the author focuses on the comparisons between two selected features in CEO compensation 
packages of two firms.  
4 To be precise, in each one of the contractual dimensions, there are several variables that capture the characteristics 
of an incentive contract. These variables include: weight of cash/equity/stock award; weight of cliff/long-term vesting 
schedule; weight of accounting/price performance measures; weight of performance-based incentives; weight of 
RPE/hybrid performance targets; number of incentive grants used; number of performance measures used; total dollar 
amount (i.e., total grant value and salary) offered in the compensation package; and relation between fixed and 
contingent pay. These variables together describe a compensation structure to a very detailed extent. One limitation 
with these contracting metrics is that the levels of performance targets are not considered because (1) it is implausible 
to aggregate grant level targets (usually for different performance measures) to meaningful package level targets, and 
(2) target levels reflect not only target difficulty but also prior performance, making inter-firm comparison less 
informative.  
5 A high value of distance score suggests that a firm’s CEO incentive contract has a structure that deviates from the 
common practice in its industry, while a low value of distance score suggests that the firm uses an incentive contract 
structure that is generic in its industry.   




measure identifies compensation packages that contain similar contractual structures relative to 
industry practice. I then empirically examine the potential determinants and consequences of 
structure homogeneity in CEO compensation packages and investigate the implications of this 
contracting practice. 
First, I examine two firm-specific factors that, if in line with optimal contracting, should be 
positively associated with CEO compensation homogeneity. Specifically, I predict and find that 
firms’ common risk and common ownership are significantly positively associated with the 
measures of structure homogeneity in CEO compensation package. Consistent with the optimal 
contracting theory, these findings support that firms use homogeneous compensation structures, in 
part, to induce principal-agent interest alignment.  
Second, I examine the associations between board-specific characteristics and CEO 
compensation homogeneity. I analyze the relationships between contract homogeneity and three 
primary board structures: board size, board independence, and multiple directorships. Among 
these board attributes, board independence, in general, is a favorable board attribute while the 
findings on board size and multiple directorships are mixed (Sah and Stiglitz 1986, 1991; Vafeas 
1999). However, regardless of their implications on board quality, these attributes all capture 
directors’ capacity to communicate with each other and the management (Cheng 2008; Harris and 
Raviv 2008; Jiraporn, Davidson, DaDalt, and Ning 2009). This aspect of board attributes is 
essential in incentive contracting as drafting an incentive contract requires specific information 
from insiders regardless of the quality of board. Consistent with my predictions, I find that firms 
with larger boards, higher percentage of outside directors, and more multiple directorships are 
more likely to use incentive contracts with greater structure homogeneity. These findings 
demonstrate that the design of incentive contracts converges to industry practice when the costs to 




communicate and obtain internal information are high for corporate boards. Although, outside 
directors and directors holding multiple board assignments may purposefully pursue compensation 
homogeneity for good reasons, the performance tests show results inconsistent with this 
explanation. In addition, I also find that the use of compensation consultants is positively 
associated with firms’ CEO compensation homogeneity.  
Through the tests examining the relation between performance and compensation 
homogeneity, I find some evidence that firms with greater structure homogeneity in their CEO 
compensation packages experience better accounting performance in the contracting period but 
experience worse performance in the subsequent accounting period. The findings on performance 
impacts suggest that the adoption of homogeneous incentive contracts represents firms’ attempts 
to optimize contract efficiency; however, following industry practice in the design of 
compensation package appears to hurt shareholders’ wealth in the long run. In other words, the 
associations between structure homogeneity and firm performance in different accounting periods 
indicate that in general the use of homogeneous contract structure is not an optimal contracting 
practice.  
To better understand what a homogeneous contract structure would look like, I examine the 
associations between structure homogeneity and five primary contract attributes: pay level, the use 
of equity award, the use of long-vesting schedule, the use of performance-based grants, and the 
use of accounting performance measures. I further examine the associations between overall 
structure homogeneity and the homogeneity in each one of the five contractual dimensions and 
find that each individual contractual dimension contributes to this overall structure characteristic. 
I also investigate the relationships between each dimension of structure homogeneity in CEO 




compensation package and the identified firm-/board-specific attributes. I further discuss the 
empirical findings in Section 5.  
This study contributes to the incentive contract literature. Firm owners use incentive 
contracting as an important tool to align managers’ interests with their own economic benefits 
(Healy and Palepu 2001). Although prior literature studies CEO incentive contracts extensively 
using both the optimal contracting approach (Murphy 1999; Core, Guay, and Larcker 2001) and 
the managerial power approach (Bebchuk and Fried 2003, 2004), many questions regarding overall 
contract structure are not empirically examined in the literature. This study provides a missing 
piece of the CEO compensation puzzle by investigating structure homogeneity in CEO 
compensation package relative to industry-wide practice. Specifically, through a measure that 
identifies tailored compensation packages from homogeneous ones, I empirically examine the 
potential determinants and effects of a package level structure characteristic.  
By identifying the determinants of structure homogeneity in CEO compensation package, 
this study extends our understanding of contracting practices in real-world business and identifies 
the institutional factors that may influence overall contractual structures. Theory-wise, the 
structure homogeneity determinants identified in this study provides direct evidence consistent 
with Bebchuk and Fried’s (2003) claim that compensation arrangements are shaped by a mixture 
of forces (e.g., social/political forces and CEO/firm characteristics). Findings in this study also 
provides some possible explanations to the existence of trending practice in incentive contracting.  
This study also contributes to the corporate governance literature. Corporate governance has 
drawn much public attention since the scandals of 2001-2002 and the financial crisis of 2008-2009 
(Larcker and Tyan 2011). The corporate board plays a crucial role in governance systems. Thus, 
researchers and practitioners are interested in investigating the effects of different board 




characteristics (e.g., Cheng 2008; Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard 2003). To ensure that the 
corporate board serves the interests of shareholders, NYSE requires that the three principal board 
committees (audit, compensation, and nominating) of listed companies contain solely independent 
directors (Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash 2011). However, this requirement may cause unintended 
consequences in firms’ monitoring processes. Similarly, prior literature documents that board size 
and multiple directorships are important factors that influence board quality. The findings of this 
study add on to the literature by revealing an impact of board size, independence, and multiple 
directorships on CEO incentive contracting that might be overlooked by regulators and 
practitioners. 
2 Theory Development 
2.1 Contracting Theories and CEO Incentive Contract 
There are two dominating theoretical frameworks in the compensation literature. The 
optimal contracting model assumes boards can design efficient incentive contracts that maximize 
shareholders’ wealth (Murphy 1999). On the contrary, the managerial power approach views 
contracting as part of the agency problem itself and managers use their power to influence 
contracting decisions (Bebchuk and Fried 2003).6  
Based on these two frameworks, the extant empirical studies investigate contracting 
behavior from five main dimensions. Findings regarding the five dimensions demonstrate that 
factors influencing one dimension of the contractual elements are likely to influence contracting 
specifications in the other dimensions. For example, Core and Guay (1999) find that the optimal 
equity incentive level is related to firm size, growth opportunities, and monitoring costs. In the 
 
6 A few review studies provide detailed summaries of the extant findings in the compensation literature: see Core, 
Guay and Larcker (2003), Frydman and Jenter (2010), Frydman and Saks (2010), Goergen and Renneboog (2011), 
and Edmans, Gabaix and Jenter (2017). 




meanwhile, prior literature also documents that CEO pay level is associated with firm size (Gabaix 
and Landier 2008; Gabaix, Landier and Sauvagnat 2014), firm risk (Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman 
2015), CEO characteristics (Graham, Li and Qiu 2012), and governance mechanisms (e.g., 
Armstrong, Ittner, and Larcker 2012; Balsam, Gu and Mao 2018; Conyon, Park and Sadler 2009). 
Additionally, a firm’s choice of performance measures depends on not only the informativeness 
of the performance measures (De Angelis and Grinstein 2015), but also firm owners’ investment 
horizons and strategic imperatives (Li and Wang 2016), which also influence a firm’s decision on 
the vesting schedule of CEO incentives (Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor 2014).  
However, these studies tend to view the choices of individual contractual terms as done in a 
vacuum. 7  Moreover, choices of different contractual terms are usually interdependent. 8  It is, 
therefore, necessary to incorporate a comprehensive set of contractual components, from different 
dimensions in particular, to examine the structure and overall characteristic of an incentive contract.  
2.2 Firm Attributes and CEO Compensation Homogeneity 
I first examine the firms-specific characteristics that can influence CEO compensation 
homogeneity within the scope of optimal contracting approach. Firms use CEO incentive contracts 
to motivate risk-averse managers to bring shareholders economic benefits (Jensen and Murphy 
1990). Incentive contracts with certain contractual structures motivate managerial actions in 
certain ways. Under the optimal contracting approach, firms are more likely to use industry-wide 
homogeneous compensation packages when doing so leads to a desirable behavioral impact. For 
 
7 As discussed in Section 1, the grants of a compensation package may use different contractual terms. For instance, 
a firm may assign a time-vesting grant and a performance-vesting grant simultaneously in the same incentive contract, 
or the firm can use different award types in these two grants.  
8 The use of some contractual terms directly determines the use of the other terms. For instance, if a firm uses 
performance-based grants, it must also determine the performance measures and performance targets for the grants. 
Some contractual terms are less likely to be associated with each other. For instance, both cash and equity awards 
(award type) can be either long-term or short-term (vesting schedule).   




instance, risk is a key factor that influences incentive contracting (Prendergast 2002). If a firm is 
largely influenced by more risk factors that also impact its industry peers in a similar fashion, the 
firm would adopt an incentive contract with a structure that is more similar to industry practice to 
address those common risks. Therefore, I expect a firm to use a more homogeneous CEO 
compensation package if it shares more common risks with its industry. This leads to the first 
hypothesis:  
H1: A firm’s structure homogeneity in its CEO compensation package is 
positively associated with the common risks shared with its industry. 
 
Furthermore, a firm owners’ primary goal is to maximize their own economic benefits. When 
shareholders use incentive contracts to ensure that their interests would align with the interests of 
managers, shareholders select specific incentive structures to serve their specific purposes. Prior 
literature finds that a firm’s CEO compensation policy depends on its shareholders’ preferences 
and investment horizon (David et al. 1998; Cadman and Sunder 2014). Therefore, when a firm has 
a higher proportion of influential shareholders who have similar preferences to other firm owners 
in the same industry (i.e., high industry common ownership) and these preferences are effectively 
incorporated in its contract design, the firm’s CEO incentive contract should also demonstrate a 
structure that converges to industry-wide practice. To test this prediction, I form the following 
hypothesis:    
H2: A firm’s CEO compensation homogeneity is positively associated with the 
proportion of common ownership shared with its industry peers. 
 
2.3 Board Attributes and CEO Compensation Homogeneity 
The board of directors is one of the most important mechanisms firm owners rely on to 
monitor and control executives’ actions (Akyol and Cohen 2013). The board of directors 
undertakes two primary roles, monitoring and advising top management (Jensen 1993; Armstrong 




et al. 2012; Larcker and Tayan 2013). Board members carry out these roles through different 
activities, including advising and monitoring the drafting of CEO incentive contracts (Faleye et al. 
2011).  
The compensation committee on the board provides advice on the design of CEO incentive 
contracts, sometimes with the assistance of compensation consultants (Cadman, Carter and 
Hillegeist 2010). The board and the shareholders can then oversee and approve the 
recommendations given by the compensation committee (Mace 1972; Price 2018). 
Agency theory suggests that CEO’s personal interests are not fully aligned, or even may 
conflict, with the interests of the firm owners (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Ross 1973). Executive 
compensation is one of the most important mechanisms to address potential agency problems 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Optimal contracting theory and managerial power theory are both 
used in the literature to explain contracting practices (Frydman and Jenter 2010). Under the optimal 
contracting approach, a corporate board is expected to design the incentive contracts that maximize 
shareholders’ wealth (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999). Firms are more likely to use 
homogenous incentive contracts if such contracts motivate mangers to act in the interests of 
shareholders. However, since directors’ behaviors are also subject to agency problems and various 
constraints (Bebchuk and Fried 2003), incentive contracting can be a venue from which managers 
extract their rents (Abernethy, Kuang and Qin 2015; Morse, Nanda and Seru 2011). Therefore, to 
better understand the underlying mechanisms that lead to structure homogeneity in CEO 
compensation, it is critical to clarify the relationship between firms’ CEO compensation 
homogeneity and corporate boards, through which incentive contracts are generated.  
Both the advising and monitoring tasks in incentive contracting require effective 
communication between disparate parties and essential information from insiders. However, 




boards with different structures may carry out these tasks differently depending on their costs of 
communication and their ability to obtain essential information. There are three board attributes 
that signal board quality in different ways, but all directly influence board members’ 
communication costs. According to Jensen (1993), board size is a factor that determines whether 
a board can function effectively. As board size increases, the members on the board bear higher 
coordination and communication costs. These costs eventually slow down the decision-making 
processes of the board of directors (Cheng 2008). Moreover, both economic and social psychology 
studies on group decision-making suggest that decisions made by larger groups are likely to be 
less risky and less extreme (Sah and Stiglitz 1986, 1991). The final choices made by a larger group 
are more likely to be “a compromise among individual positions.” (Moscovici and Zavalloni 1969). 
Under the context of drafting incentive contracts, board consensus on the structure of an incentive 
contract is easier to emerge if the contract structure is more similar to common practice in the 
industry. These arguments are consistent with the standpoint raised by Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
that social/political forces hinder the construction of tailored contractual structures. Putting this 
intuition together, larger boards are more likely to approve homogeneous compensation structures, 
which can be readily justified as legitimate practice commonly observed in the industry. Therefore, 
I form the following hypothesis: 
H3a: A firm’s CEO compensation homogeneity is positively associated with its 
board size. 
 
Similarly, director independence may also affect a board’s decision to use homogeneous 
contracts. Corporate boards are composed of either affiliated or outside directors, and the latter 
provide valuable monitors but also bear higher communication costs when acquiring information 
from insiders (Faleye et al. 2011). Nevertheless, major stock exchanges (i.e., NYSE and Nasdaq) 
and regulatory bodies pay close attention to the composition of the boards of directors, board 




independence in particular. NYSE, for instance, requires that the compensation, nominating, and 
audit committees be entirely composed of independent directors, while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX) imposes the same requirement for the audit committee.  
Although outside directors can effectively curtail agency problems, their ability to acquire 
relevant information from insiders is limited (Harris and Raviv 2008). If insiders do not provide 
sufficient information in the process of incentive contracting, the outsiders will have to make 
decisions based on alternative information sources, such as industry-wide practice.9 Therefore, 
higher percentage of outside directors on board may further induce the use of homogenous 
incentive contracts. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:   
H3b: A firm’s CEO compensation homogeneity is positively associated with its 
board independence.  
 
Another important board attribute that draws much attention in the corporate governance 
literature is multiple directorships (Ferris et al. 2003). This attribute describes the number of 
external board assignments held by directors on the board. One stream of literature suggests that 
directors who have multiple board assignments may be too busy to effectively fulfill their 
monitoring roles, leading to weaker corporate governance and worse firm performance (Core et al. 
1999; Jiraporn et al. 2009). Other studies indicate that multiple directorships signal director quality 
and reputational capital (Vafeas 1999), which are positively related to firm performance and are 
in line with shareholder interests (Miwa and Ramseyer 2000; Brown and Maloney 1999). 
 
9 Both board size and board independence also relate to firms’ agency problems. On the one hand, boards with larger 
size have more severe agency problems because individual directors’ costs of not fulfilling their monitoring 
responsibility is relatively lower (Cheng 2008). The agency problems caused by larger board size may also affect the 
CEO compensation homogeneity of a firm. On the other hand, prior literature views board independence as a favorable 
characteristic of corporate boards, because outside directors can better perform their monitoring duties (Faleye et al. 
2011). Contrary to the effect of large board size on agency problems, board independence may decrease agency 
problems in a firm. However, Larcker and Tayan (2011) point out that it is difficult to infer the quality of the board 
by examining the structure of the board. Therefore, I do not make a prediction based on board quality inferred from 
observable board attributes in my hypotheses (Larcker and Tayan, 2011). 




Regarding the practice of incentive contracting, this board attribute is more likely to induce the 
adoptions of homogenous CEO compensation packages because director busyness serves as 
another factor that increases the communication costs for the board of directors. For instance, 
Jiraporn et al. (2009) find that individual directors with multiple board assignments are more likely 
to be absent from board meetings. In addition, directors would be more likely to refer to industry-
wide practice in incentive contracting if they have board experiences from multiple firms. Thus, 
my next hypothesis is:  
H3c: A firm’s CEO compensation homogeneity is positively associated with its 
multiple directorships.  
 
It is also possible that board independence and multiple directorships induce compensation 
homogeneity through mechanisms other than the above. Specifically, outside directors and 
directors who hold external board assignments are more likely to be aware of industry contracting 
practices that are more effective and widely used. Therefore, regardless of the communication 
costs to obtain inside information in incentive contracting, board independence and multiple 
directorships may still induce the adoption of homogeneous incentive contracts if such practice 
sounds plausible to the board of directors. This argument gives an alternative explanation to the 
predictions in H3’s.  
2.4 CEO Incentive Contract Homogeneity and Compensation Consultant 
In the process of incentive contracting, firms can seek advice from compensation consultants. 
A sizable proportion of large U.S. firms hire compensation consultants in the design of incentive 
contracts.10 Although consultants provide professional advice on compensation designs, there are 
critics questioning the role of compensation consultants (Bebchuk and Fried 2003, 2004; U.S. 
 
10 The sample firms in ISS Incentive Lab database are large U.S. firms. Based on the data, 81.5% of the firm-years in 
the sample of this study show record of using compensation consultants.   




House of Representative 2007). In particular, compensation consultants are viewed as a 
mechanism to justify CEO pay (Armstrong et al. 2012). It is true that compensation consultants 
may have the expertise to design more tailored incentive contracts, but it is unlikely that they have 
more inside information than the board of directors to customize CEO compensation packages. 
Even if consultants manage to obtain the information necessary for tailored incentive contracts, as 
discussed in Section 2.2, the board of directors may not be able to tell it is plausible to adopt 
contracting practices that deviate much from industry norm. On the contrary, with access to a good 
amount of contracting data, compensation consultants are more likely to recommend certain 
practices readily supported by the data at hand. Therefore, I expect that firms with compensation 
consultants use CEO compensation packages more similar to industry practice: 
H4: A firm’s CEO compensation homogeneity is positively associated with its 
use of compensation consultant.  
 
2.5 CEO Incentive Contract Homogeneity and Firm Performance 
In this section, I discuss the consequences of adopting homogeneous incentive contracts.  
Based on the discussions in Section 2.2 and 2.3, as well as the findings from prior literature, the 
underlying reasons for using homogeneous compensation packages are mixed. Showing the 
consequences of using homogeneous incentive contracts provides insights into the implications of 
the underlying construct.  
On the one hand, structure homogeneity in CEO compensation packages may fit well in 
CEO labor market dynamic. Firms use incentive contracts to attract or retain talent (Carter, Franco 
and Tuna 2019). By using common contracting practices, firms make their incentive contracts 
appealing and easy to compare. Therefore, homogeneous compensation packages may bring 
shareholders greater economic benefits by attracting or retaining competent executives. On the 
other hand, structure homogeneity in CEO compensation packages may be just an easily justifiable 




camouflage that CEOs can use to conceal their rent extracting activities (Bebchuk and Fried 2003). 
Therefore, homogeneous compensation packages may not serve to align manager and owner 
interests and may negatively influence shareholder wealth. It is also possible that structure 
homogeneity has no effect on firm performance as a result of mixed forces. Therefore, I examine 
the following research question:  
RQ: What is the association between CEO compensation homogeneity and firm 
performance?  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Sample Selection 
I obtain CEO compensation information from ISS Incentive Lab Academic Data (1998-
2018). The database provides contract information at grant level. There are 75,068 CEO grants 
available among a total of 408,126 grant samples. These CEO grants are components of 25,151 
CEO compensation packages constructed by 2,225 firms. The CEO grant samples are used to 
construct the compensation homogeneity measures (see Section 3.2). All final data is collected at 
firm-year level to conduct analyses. Table 1 outlines the construction of the samples used in the 
analyses.  
I start with 25,151 firm-years and remove any firm-year observations without complete grant 
level data. I remove observations that have missing compensation homogeneity values or missing 
CEO attributes, leaving 11,463 sample firm-years. I then require ownership information from 
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F), firms’ financial information from COMPUSTAT, 
market data from CSRP, and analyst following data from I/B/E/S. This procedure further reduces 
the sample size to 10,810 firm-years. The sample is further reduced by 1,175 observations in the 
analyses of board attributes. Board attribute data is obtained from BoardEx. 
 




3.2 Measuring CEO Compensation Homogeneity 
I construct a package-level contracting matrix (1 by 14) for each firm-year in the sample 
based on the grant level contractual components from different aspects. The compiled package-
level contracting matrix presents an incentive contract based on the five key dimensions of a 
compensation package (i.e., award type, vesting schedule, performance measure, target type, and 
pay structure). Appendix A describes the procedure of aggregating grant level information to 
package level in detail. Table A1 presents an example of a CEO compensation structure at grant 
level. The grant level information is then translated to package level information. As shown in 
Table A2, all the contractual components are translated into a weight relative to the total grant 
value of an incentive contract. This measure incorporates different aspects of contract elements all 
at once, capturing the package-level contracting status from a comprehensive perspective.  
A firm’s package level information is then compared with each one of its industry peer’s 
contracting matrix based on the quantified contractual terms and each pair of the comparison 
produces a value that represents the dissimilarity between the two contracts compared. I use two 
alternative methods to calculate the distance of each contract pair: Euclidean distance (Hair, Black, 
Anderson, and Tatham 2006) of standardized Principal Component scores and Mahalanobis 
distance (Mahalanobis 1936). Both methods incorporate the correlations between elements and 
project multi-dimensional data to a single space.11 As described in Appendix B, I then take the 
median of all the distance values derived from the pairwise comparisons and this value becomes 
the inverse of a firm’s CEO compensation homogeneity. I take the natural logarithm of one plus 
 
11 The calculation of Mahalonobis distance automatically weighs each variable equally and accounts for covariances 
(Brown 2017), while the calculation of Euclidean distance itself does not account for scale and covariance. Instead, 
variables used in the calculation of Euclidean distance are first transformed using PCA. This procedure takes care of 
the two issues aforementioned.  




the distance measure and reverse the value (Brown 2017) to represent CEO compensation 
homogeneity. To make sure the comparisons between incentive contracts are reasonable and 
complete, the construction of CEO compensation homogeneity requires the information of grant 
value for each grant. If any one of a firm’s incentive grants has missing grant value, the firm is 
removed from the sample firm-year. This data procedure brings down the sample size to 9,635 
observations. I further define all variables used in the analyses in Appendix C. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
3.3 Firm and Board Attributes vs. CEO Compensation Homogeneity 
First, I examine the relationships between the identified firm-/board- specific attributes and 
CEO compensation homogeneity with the following regression model: 
   𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑗 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑𝛽𝑘 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
∑𝛽𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                     (1)                                                                                            
where i and t denote firm and fiscal year subscripts, respectively. The dependent variable 
Homogeneity is the main variable of interest. It represents one of the measures of CEO 
compensation homogeneity calculated for each firm-year (i.e. Homogeneity_ed and 
Homogeneity_md), and firm_det represents two independent variables, firm i’s common risk 
(Common_risk) and common ownership (Common_own). The term board_det includes three 
independent variables: Board size (Board_size), board independence (Board_ind), and multiple 
directorship (Board_busy). Consultant is an indicator variable, which equals to 1 if firm i in year 
t hires a compensation consultant, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients on firm_det will be used to 
examine the association between a firm’s CEO compensation homogeneity and its common risk 
(H1) and the proportion of common ownership (H2). The coefficients on board_det will be used 
to examine the association between CEO compensation homogeneity and board size (H3a), board 




independence (H3b), and multiple directorships (H3c). Lastly, the coefficient β6 on Consultant 
will be used to investigate the H4. Controls denotes controls variables. I include year and industry 
fixed effects to account for the effect of time-trends and time-invariant industry effect because the 
extent of structure homogeneity varies across industries (Figure 5). I also cluster standard errors 
at firm level to adjust for unobserved firm effects (Petersen 2009). 
The general control variables include CEO and firm characteristics that are documented to 
be influential on the structure of CEO incentive contracts in prior compensation literature. I first 
include several CEO characteristics among the control variables. The CEO level control variables 
include age (CEO_age), years in position (CEO_tenure), and chairman on board  (CEO_chair). 
These variables capture CEO characteristics such as risk preferences, experiences, and power (e.g., 
Hill and Phan 1991; Serfling 2014; Amzaleg, et al. 2014; Essen, Otten and Carberry 2015). All the 
CEO control variables are measured in the contracting period.  
Other than CEO characteristics, firms with different characteristics may require different 
contract structures to induce certain managerial decisions. I include firm characteristics such as 
size (Asset), growth opportunities (MTB), leverage (Leverage), and prior performance (i.e. ROA 
and RET) to control for firms’ operational environment. In addition, I also control for firms’ 
industry competition (Concentration) as it affects firms’ strategic move (Bushman, Hendricks and 
Williams 2016). I include analyst following (Analyst) to control for firms’ market attention and 
information environment, which also influences the components of incentive contracts 
theoretically (Abowd 1990; Lazear 1986). Another important factor that impacts the structure of 
an incentive contract is ownership structure. Large shareholders can exert governance and 
influence firm decisions (Edmans 2014). Thus I control for percentage of large shareholders of 
each sample firm (BlockOwn). Prior literature also identifies firm risk as an essential determinant 




of compensation structures (Cao and Wang 2013; Cheng et al. 2015; Gong et al. 2011). Therefore, 
I include variables that control for prior firm risk (i.e. EarnVol and RetVol). All the firm control 
variables are measured in the accounting period prior to the contracting period. 
3.4 CEO Compensation Homogeneity vs. Firm Performance 
To better understand the effects of structure homogeneity in CEO compensation package, I 
test the association between compensation homogeneity and firm performance. Specifically, I 
examine the effect of compensation homogeneity on accounting and market performance in 
different horizons. I estimate the following regression model to investigate RQ: 
   𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (2)                                                                   
where i and t denote firm and fiscal year subscripts respectively, and n equals 0, 1, 2, or 3. It 
signifies the number of year(s) after contracting period t. The dependent variable Perform refers 
to a firm’s accounting performance: return on assets (ROA). Perform also includes stock 
performance: returns (RET). The independent variable of interest is Homogeneity, which 
represents either one of the compensation homogeneity measures constructed (Homogeneity_ed or 
Homogeneity_md). I also include firm and CEO characteristics in the regression models to control 
for the effects of other factors on firm performance and compensation attributes. I include year 
and firm fixed effects to account for the effect of time-trends and time-invariant firm effect on firm 
performance.  β1 will be used to investigate the research question in Section 2.5.  
3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 2 Panel A, I report the descriptive statistics on variables of interest and controls for 
all sample firm-years. The firm size in total assets of my sample is $ 5,791 million on average, 
which is on the right tail of the sample firms in recent compensation studies (Balsam, Gu and Mao 
2018; Abernethy et al. 2015; Tice 2020). This figure is consistent with the notion that ISS Incentive 




Lab provide compensation information of large public firms for each year (Bettis, et al. 2018; Tice 
2019).  
Table 2 Panel B presents the trends of the primary contractual terms during the sample period. 
Consistent with prior literature, the first two columns show that CEO incentive contracts become 
increasingly complex as they include 59 percent more incentive grants and use four times more 
performance measures over the past two decades. As shown in Figure 1, over 90 percent of the 
sample firm-years use equity awards in their CEO compensation packages. Although equity 
awards remain popular over the past two decades, firms are gradually replacing option awards with 
stock awards in terms of the weight in total value of incentive grants, while the weight of cash 
awards moves around 20 to 30 percent of total grant value. The value of contingent pay in CEO 
compensation fluctuates largely from year to year, but it has a clear increasing trend (see Figure 
2). Similarly the weight of performance-based incentives has increased dramatically and more 
firms have started to use RPE grants and grants with both APE and RPE (see Figure 3). Moreover, 
compared with stock performance measure, accounting performance measures are more widely 
used by firms in their CEO compensation packages (see Figure 4). Table 2 Panel C presents the 
usage of primary contract features by major industries. These statistics indicate that the use of 
contractual features varies across industries.  
Table 3 summarizes the correlations of each pair of selected continuous variables used in the 
analyses. Based on Table 3, the correlation between firm size and compensation homogeneity is 
negative (-0.0543 and -0.0843), meaning larger firms tend to use more tailored contract structure, 
as these firms are usually more complex. On the other hand, the correlation between firms’ analyst 
coverage and compensation homogeneity are positive (0.0909 and 0.0938), indicating that 
compensation homogeneity might be subject to the impact of market attention. I conduct a number 




of formal tests to examine the determinants and consequences of CEO compensation homogeneity 
and discuss the results.  
4. Results 
4.1 Tests of Firm and Board attributes 
Table 4 presents the results of regression model (1). Columns (1) and (3) use 
Homogeneity_ed as dependent variable, while columns (2) and (4) use Homogeneity_md as 
dependent variable. Columns (1) and (2) demonstrate the associations between specific CEO/firm 
characteristics and compensation homogeneity. The negative coefficients on CEO age and tenure 
suggest a positive association with the use of tailored compensation packages. This is because 
when board of directors have greater familiarity with CEOs, they are more capable of drafting 
incentive contracts that fit CEO attributes. These associations are also consistent with the argument 
that the board of directors need to obtain more information from management to design tailored 
incentive contracts.  
H1 predicts that firms’ common risk is positively associated with their CEO compensation 
homogeneity. Columns (3) and (4) show the regression results with the specified firm and board 
attributes of interest. The coefficients of Common_risk are positive and significant for the two 
Homogeneity measures (0.069, t=3.99; 0.101, t=2.82). These results support my prediction in H1 
that, under optimal contracting assumption, a firm tends to use more homogeneous incentive 
contract if the amount of common risks shared between the firm and its industry is high. The 
coefficients on Common_own support H2, in which I predict that a firm tends to use more 
homogeneous incentive contract if its shareholders simultaneously own stakes of more industry 
peers (0.168, t=2.74; 0.340, t=2.51). These findings imply that optimal contracting, in part, 
explains the existence of structure homogeneity in CEO compensation package.  




 The coefficients on Board_size, Board_ind, and Board_busy presented in Table 4 also 
support the predictions in H3a, H3b, and H3c, respectively. First, I find a significantly positive 
association between Board_size and Homogeneity (0.063, t=3.61; 0.082, t=2.15), supporting my 
prediction in H3a that large board size increases communication costs and induces the use of 
homogeneous incentive contracts. Second, in H3b I predict that high degree of board independence 
makes it more difficult to obtain information from management, leading to the adoption of 
industry-wide contracting practice. Consistent with my prediction, the coefficients on Board_ind 
are also significantly positive (0.142, t=2.50; 0.334, t=3.01). Lastly, consistent with my prediction 
in H3c, I find a positive association between Board_busy and Homogeneity (0.045, t=2.78; 0.090, 
t=2.49). This finding further supports that certain board attributes impede a firm’s adoption of 
tailored incentive contracts.  
H4 predicts that the use of compensation consultant increases CEO compensation 
homogeneity because consultants are more likely to use available industry-wide data to support 
their recommendations. Also, recommendations backed by industry-wide practice are more likely 
to be accepted by the board of directors. The coefficients on Consultant strongly support my 
prediction in H4 (0.099, t=5.97; 0.159, t=4.66).   
4.2 Tests of Firm Performance 
In this section, I discuss the results reported in Table 5. This table shows the results of 
regression model (2), where the dependent variable is one of the performance measures (i.e. ROA 
and RET) measured in different accounting periods. The independent variable of interest is 
Homogeneity (i.e. Homogeneity_ed and Homogeneity_md). In Panel A and B of Table 5, columns 
(1) through (8) show ROA in year t (contracting period), t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively. The 
coefficient is positive and significant for one homogeneity measure Homogeneity_md (0.005, 




t=2.03) in column (2) but becomes negative in columns (3) and (5) (-0.015, t=-2.92; -0.015, t=-
2.81).  Panel B of Table 5 does not show positive performance impact in year t but does show 
negative performance impact in year t+1 and t+3. To summarize, the test results presented in Table 
5 provide some evidence that compensation homogeneity negatively impacts firms’ accounting 
and stock performance in the subsequent accounting period.  
5. Additional Analyses 
5.1 Contract Attributes and Compensation Homogeneity 
In this section, I examine CEO compensation homogeneity, the construct of interest. I first 
examine the relations between primary contract attributes and compensation homogeneity. 
Examining the associations between compensation homogeneity and individual contract attributes 
further reveals what a homogenous CEO incentive contract would look like. I modify model (1) 
and estimate the following regression model: 
   𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑗 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑𝛽𝑘 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                     (3)                                                
where Contract represents five primary contract attributes for firm i in year t: (1) The total value 
of pay from salary and bonus (Pay); (2) The use of equity award (Award_equity); (3) The use of 
long-term vesting schedule (Vest_long); (4) The use of performance-based grants 
(PerformanceBase); and (5) The use of accounting performance measures 
(Measure_accounting).12  
Table 6 presents the results for regression model (3). The coefficients on Contract provide 
some insights on what compensation homogeneity is capturing. The coefficient on Pay is 
 
12 Award_equity, Vest_long, PerformanceBase, and Measure_accounting are all indicator variables, which equal 1 if 
firm i uses the specified contract component in any one of its incentive grants, and 0 otherwise.  




significantly negative (-0.036, t=-2.7) when the dependent variable is Homogeneity_md, indicating 
that firms may compensate CEOs with higher pay for using tailored incentive contracts. The 
coefficients on Award_equity (0.344, t=24.57; 0.422, t=14.12), Vest_long (0.237, t=11.57; 0.631, 
t=18.56), and Measure_accounting (0.202, t=8.45; 0.580, t=13.46) are all positive and significant, 
while the coefficients on PerformanceBase are significantly negative (-0.175, t=-6.47; -0.551, t=-
12.00).13 These results indicate that the choices of contractual features inherently influence the 
structure homogeneity of an incentive contract. In particular, a performance-based grant is more 
likely to introduce unique elements to the contract through different combinations of performance 
measures. However, firms seem to use equity awards, accounting performance measures, and 
vesting horizon in similar fashions. What is more, the negative relation between pay level and 
structure homogeneity is in line with findings in prior literature regarding compensation 
complexity and compensation risk (Albuquerque, Carter, and Lynch 2018; Albuquerque, 
Albuquerque, Carter, and Dong 2020). That is, with fewer reference points, tailored incentive 
contracts could be perceived as more complex and riskier by managers. Therefore, CEOs need to 
be compensated at higher pay level when their incentive contracts are less similar to industry 
practice.  
5.2 Structure Homogeneity of Individual Contractual Components 
Next, I examine the structure homogeneity based on individual dimensions of contract 
components (i.e. award type, vesting schedule, performance measure, target type, and pay). This 
test explores whether the overall structure homogeneity is driven by the structure homogeneity of 
 
13 Some of the contractual features included in the tests are highly correlated, therefore potential multicollinearity 
issue may incur. Using a Variance Inflation Factors (VIF), I test for multicollinearity among the independent variables 
of interest. The VIFs do not exceed the threshold value of 10, therefore I keep the contractual variables in the same 
regression models.  




any particular dimensions. I use the following regression model to investigate the relationships 
between structure homogeneity of individual dimensions and the overall structure homogeneity:  
  𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑐𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑗 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +∑𝛽𝑘 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                              (4)                               
where Homogeneity_iv represents the key dimensions of contract components used to construct 
the overall structure homogeneity of a compensation package. Table 8 Panel A reports the results 
of model (4). The coefficients on Homogeneity_iv are all significantly positive, indicating that the 
overall structure homogeneity in CEO compensation package is not driven by the homogeneity of 
any single dimension of contract components.  
I re-run model (1), replacing dependent variables with Homogeneity_iv to investigate how 
firm-/board- specific attributes affect the structure of each dimension.14 Results presented in Panel 
B of Table 8 show that the identified firm/board attributes influence the structure homogeneity of 
individual contract dimensions in similar manners directionally, except hg_Target. Specifically, 
when the dependent variable represents structure homogeneity of target types (hg_Target), the 
coefficient on Board_ind is marginally significant (-0.215, t=-1.88), while the coefficient on 
Consultant is negative and significant (-0.166, t=-6.59). These results imply that outside directors 
and consultants may rely more on industry-wide practice but less on inside information from 
management to draft customized structure of target types.   
I also re-examine model (2) using Homogeneity_iv as independent variables and report the 
results in Panel C of Table 7. The structure homogeneity of individual contract dimensions imposes 
 
14 The regression results of model (4) using Homogeneity_iv calculated with Mahalanobis distance provide the same 
inferences as shown in Table 7.  




different impacts on firm performance. The mixed results shown in Panel C indicate that individual 
contract dimensions may not be sufficient to explain the overall performance impact of structure 
homogeneity in CEO compensation package.  
6. Conclusion 
Extending the extant literature documenting and explaining the existence of trending 
practice in CEO incentive contracting, this study empirically investigates compensation 
homogeneity, a contract structure attribute at compensation package level and identifies factors 
that contribute to such phenomenon. The extant literature uses the relation between realized pay 
and shareholder wealth to access the impact of compensation structure (Jensen and Murphy 1990; 
Mishra, McConaughy, and Gobeli 2000; Brick, Palmon and Wald 2012). Strong pay-performance 
relationship is considered as a favorable feature in incentive contracts by regulators and investors 
(Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, and Kalpathy 2010; Gerakos, Ittner, and Larcker 2007). However, the 
effectiveness of performance-based incentives varies with firm owners’ capacity to monitor and 
evaluate managers’ input (Lazear 1986; Jensen and Murphy 1990). It is, therefore, difficult to 
translate theoretically plausible pay-performance relationship into empirically tractable models 
(Abowd 1990).15  Moreover, CEO compensation packages with dissimilar structures may not 
necessarily lead to different pay-performance relationship. Through a horizontal comparison of 
incentive contract structures, the homogeneity measure in this study incorporates the primary 
contractual components indiscriminately, unveiling a more complete picture of the effect of 
package level homogeneity in CEO compensation.  
 
15 The impacts of incentives on manager behaviors can even fall outside of the boundary of the standard principal-
agent model, as managers’ behaviors are driven by not only economic benefits, but also certain social preferences 
(Stevens and Thevaranjan 2010). Therefore, apart from the contingent elements in CEO incentive contract, the role of 
non-contingent part should not be ignored.  




Using this measure, I identify firms that use similar incentive contract structures to industry 
practice and show evidence that compensation homogeneity unexplained by general firm/CEO 
factors is associated with undesirable outcomes for firm owners. More importantly, the findings in 
this study provide meaningful practical implications to both regulators and practitioners. 
Specifically, when implementing policies to improve board independence and multiple 
directorships, firms and regulators should be aware of the unintended effect of their boards of 
directors on the processes of incentive contracting. It is true that outside directors and those who 
hold multiple board memberships may impose stronger monitor and provide better advice, firms 
may not be able to obtain desirable CEO incentive contracts out of such board composition. It is, 
therefore, important to put in additional mechanisms to fill in such unintended information gap in 
incentive contracting. Furthermore, the findings in this study also reveal that compensation 
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Appendix A. Contractual Components Used to Compare CEO Incentive Contracts  















num The weight of cash awards over the total value of all the 
incentive grants in a compensation package. The weight 
is calculated as total value (at target level) of incentive 
grants that use cash awards divided by total expected 







num The weight of option awards over the total value of all 
the incentive grants in a compensation package. The 
weight is calculated as total value of incentive grants that 
use option awards divided by total fair value of all 







num The weight of stock awards over the total value of all the 
incentive grants in a compensation package. The weight 
is calculated as total value of incentive grants that use 






num The weight of cliff vesting over the total value of all the 





num The weight of long-term vesting (longer than 11 months) 







num The weight of performance-based incentive grants over 











num The weight of accounting performance measures over the 
total value of all the incentive grants in a compensation 
package. 








num The weight of price performance measures over the total 






num The weight of RPE incentive grants over the total value 




num The weight of RPE/ABS incentive grants over the total 



























num Natural logarithm of the total dollar value of a 
compensation package, which is calculated as the sum of 
annual salary and the total fair value of all the incentive 
grants at grant date. The total value of each incentive 
grant is collected based on award types (a firm-year 
observation is removed from the sample if any one of the 
incentive grants has missing grant value).16  
• Equity awards: grant date fair value disclosed in 
the proxy statement. Following Bettis, Bizjak, 
Coles, and Kalpathy (2018), for missing values 
of stock awards, I estimate the missing values 
using stock price during the grant year. For 
missing values of option awards, I estimate the 
missing values based on the Black-Scholes 
model (Yermack 1995). 
• Non-equity awards: dollar amount to be awarded 
at target level performance. 
(14) Pay_ratio 
 
num The percentage of fixed pay offered in a compensation 











16 An alternative way to treat the missing grant value is to remove firm-year observations as long as they have any one 
grant with missing grant value. Using homogeneity measures with this sampling criteria, I find similar results for the 
tests in the analyses.  




Table A1 BROADCOM CORPORATION CEO Compensation Structure at Grant Level  
Note: This table summarizes the compensation structure of BROADCOM CORPORATION in 2007. The 














1 Cash Cliff Short Accounting Sales/Other/Profit 
Margin 
absolute 32,500 
2 Option Ratable Long Time - - 2,435,700 
3 Stock None Long Time - - 3,786,950 
 
Table A2 BROADCOM CORPORATION CEO Compensation Structure at Package Level 
Note: This table demonstrates the construction of a package level compensation structure based on information in 
Table A1. A contracting metric with fourteen variables is constructed for each firm-year to represent its 
compensation structure (as shown in the bolded box below). 
Award type Award_Cash_weight = 0.005 32,500/6,255,150 
 Award_Option_weight = 0.389 2,435,700/6,255,150 
 Award_Stock_weight = 0.605 3,786,950/6,255,150 
Vesting schedule Vest_cliff_weight = 0.005 32,500/6,255,150 
Vest_long_weight = 0.995 (2,435,700 + 3,786,950)/6,255,150 
Performance measure Perf_performbase_weight = 0.005 32,500/6,255,150 
 Measure_n = 3 Number of performance measures 
used 
 Measure_accounting_weight = 0.005 32,500/6,255,150 
 Measure_Price_weight = 0 No price performance measure used 
Target type Perf_RPE_weight = 0 No RPE used 
 Perf_absrel_weight = 0 No RPE used 
Pay Grant_n = 3 Number of grants used 
 Pay = 15.66 ln(32,500 + 2,435,700 + 3,786,950 
+60,000) 






















Appendix B. Calculating Structure Homogeneity in CEO Compensation Package 
Principal Component Analysis and Euclidean Distance 
To incorporate a more complete set of contractual terms in the construction of contract homogeneity, I 
compute an alternative distance measure using Euclidean distance after transforming original contracting 
metric vectors into vectors of essential factors. This procedure not only takes care of variations in scale, but 
also linearly transforms variables into a lower dimensional space while preserving information to the best 
extant. In such a way, the following Euclidean distance function can be applied to compare two incentive 
contracts:  




where D is the value of distance between two objects represented by vectors a and b.  
I follow the following steps to calculate CEO compensation homogeneity: 
1. Fourteen contract components from five different dimensions are selected to describe a CEO 
incentive contract (defined in Appendix A). Each sample firm-year is assigned with a 1×14 
contracting matrix representing its contract structure. 
2. Based on the fourteen variables used by firms in the same year, fourteen coefficients are 
generated to define a single principal component. I maintain fourteen principal components as they 
all explain a significant portion of total variance (above 70%). I end up with a 14×14 coefficient 
matrix. The contracting matrices are transformed to a new 1×14 matrices, which is the products of 
the original contracting matrix (1×14) and this coefficient matrix (14×14).  
3. Using the vectors containing PCA scores, the Euclidean distance function can be applied to 
pairwise compare firms’ incentive contracts in the same industry year. 
4. Similarly, for each specific firm year, I calculate its CEO compensation homogeneity by taking 
the median value of its pairwise D’s with all its industry peers and taking the natural logarithm of 
the inverse of 1+D (Homogeneity_ed). 
 
Mahalanobis Distance 
Mahalanobis distance is conventionally used to measure the distance between a random point and a 
distribution (Mahalanobis 1936). It can also be used to measure dissimilarity between two random vectors 
using the following function:  
𝐷2 = (𝑎 − 𝑏)𝑇 ∗ 𝐶−1 ∗ (𝑎 − 𝑏) 
where D2 is the value representing distance between two objects in a multi-dimensional space. In this study, 
the formula can be interpreted as: a and b are the quantified contracting metric vectors of two incentive 
contracts, while C-1 denotes the inverse covariance matrix of the fourteen variables in the contracting metric 
vector. The covariance matrix is calculated to capture the joint variability of each pair of variables in the 
contracting metric vector. This distance measure incorporates between variable correlations and different 
variable scales.  
I follow the following steps to calculate CEO compensation homogeneity: 
1. Fourteen contract components from five different dimensions are selected to describe a CEO 
incentive contract (defined in Appendix B). Therefore, each sample firm-year is assigned with a 
1×14 contracting matrix representing its contract structure. 
2. A covariance matrix is calculated based on the fourteen variables of all sample firms. I then take 
the inverse of the covariance matrix.  
3. Firms in the same industry year are then compared pairwise using their contractual term vectors 
and the covariance matrix.  




4. For each specific firm year, I calculate its CEO incentive homogeneity by taking the median 
value of its pairwise D2’s with all its industry peers and taking the natural logarithm of the inverse 
of 1+D2 (Homogeneity_md). 
  




Appendix C. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Homogeneity CEO compensation homogeneity calculated using distance measure. There are 
two alternative measures for this variable: Homogeneity_ed and 
Homogeneity_md (see Appendix A and B). 
 
Homogeneity_iv Structure homogeneity based on individual contract components calculated with 
PCA and Euclidean Distance. There are five dimensions of contract components: 
hg_awardtype, hg_vesting, hg_performance, hg_target, and hg_pay.  
 
Pay Natural logarithm of the total dollar amount offered in a compensation package, 
which is calculated as the sum of annual salary and the total value of all the 
incentive grants (see Appendix A). 
 
Vest_long An indicator that equals to 1 if a firm uses any long-vesting grants in its CEO 
incentive contract in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Equity_award An indicator that equals to 1 if a firm uses any equity award in its CEO incentive 
contract in a given year, and 0 otherwise.  
 
PerformanceBase An indicator that equals to 1 if a firm uses any performance-based incentive in its 
CEO incentive contract in a given year, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Measure_accounting An indicator that equals to 1 if a firm uses any accounting performance measure 
in its CEO incentive contract in a given year, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Common_risk Stock return variance that is explained by value-weighted industry stock returns. 
It is the R2 from regressing the firm’s stock returns on value-weighted industry 
return (two-digit SIC) over the prior 36 months. 
 
Common_own Average fraction of industry peers’ shares held by a firm’s top 5 shareholders, 





𝑖 , where vik is shareholder i’s ownership 
share of firm k, while i is also one of the top 5 shareholders of firm j. k denotes 
all the industry competitors of firm j (see Anton et al. 2018). 
 
Board_size Natural logarithm of total number of directors serving on board. 
 
Board_ind Percentage of independent directors serving on board. An independent director is 
defined as directors who are marked as NED in BoardEx database.  
 
Board_busy Natural logarithm of the average number of board assignments the directors of a 
firm hold during a fiscal year.  
 
Consultant An indicator that equals to 1 if a firm uses a compensation consultant, and 0 
otherwise. 
  
CEO_age Natural logarithm of a CEO’s age in a given fiscal year. 
 
CEO_tenure Natural logarithm of the number of years a CEO has been in the position in a 
given fiscal year.  
 
CEO_chair An indicator that equals to 1 if a CEO serves as Chairman or Vice Chairman on 
board, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Asset Natural logarithm of total year end assets. 















Analyst Natural logarithm of the number of financial analysts who follow a firm. 
 
BlockOwn Percentage of shares that are owned by blockholders. 
 
ROA Return on assets, which is measured as income before extraordinary items 
divided by end of year total assets.  
 
RET Buy-and-hold stock return over the holding period, calculated as the ending share 
price minus the beginning share price divided by the beginning share price.  
 
EarnVol Standard deviation of earnings (income before extraordinary items divided by 
end of year total assets) over the past 4 years. 
 
RetVol Standard deviation of monthly returns of a year.  
 
Concentration Sum of the squares of the market shares of the firms’ sales within each two-digit 
SIC industry.  
  




Figure 1.  
Note: This figure illustrates the trend of the percentage usage of each award type in CEO 













Note: This figure illustrates the trend of percentage usage of performance-based incentives and RPE 




Note: This figure illustrates the trend of percentage usage of accounting and price performance 
measures in CEO compensation packages among all the sample firm-years. 
 
 



































Table 1. Sample Selection  
 Firm-Year Observations 
Firms in ISS with incentive grant data from 1998 to 2018 25,151 
          Less firms missing CEO incentive contract homogeneity values (7,106) 
          Less firms missing CEO attributes (6,582) 
          Less firms missing general controls (653) 
          Less firms missing board attributes (1,175) 
 9,635 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses (Panel A) and variables used 
to construct the measure of compensation homogeneity (Homogeneity). The sample used to test the main hypotheses 
include 9,635 observations. All continuous variables used in the analyses are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. 
The variables used in the analyses are defined in Appendix C.  
Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the fourteen contract components by fiscal year. 
Panel C reports the descriptive statistics for the usage of primary contract features by industry.  
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of All Variables Used in the Analyses 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Homogeneity_ed 9,635 -1.66982 0.219031 -2.71129 -0.53591 
Homogeneity_md 9,635 -2.89762 0.468514 -4.72156 -0.8952 
hg_Award 9,635 -0.96058 0.34015 -1.8074 0 
hg_Vesting 9,635 -0.82656 0.3108 -1.97121 0 
hg_Performance 9,635 -1.09217 0.3983 -2.25542 0 
hg_Target 9,635 -0.47526 0.567293 -2.2639 0 
hg_Pay 9,635 -0.91971 0.24236 -1.94366 -0.48009 
Pay 9,635 15.51449 0.839265 12.06011 17.72753 
Award_equity 9,635 0.944927 0.228135 0 1 
Vest_long 9,635 0.973843 0.159611 0 1 
PerformanceBase 9,635 0.848268 0.358779 0 1 
Measure_accounting 9,635 0.824972 0.380011 0 1 
Common_risk 9,635 0.383991 0.223916 0.000228 0.925412 
Common_own 9,635 0.125552 0.061718 0 0.338319 
Board_size 9,635 2.503587 0.269955 1.609438 3.178054 
Board_ind 9,635 0.85176 0.077606 0.444444 1 
Board_busy 9,635 0.528305 0.234704 0 1.252763 
Consultant 9,635 0.814652 0.388599 0 1 
CEO_age 9,635 4.011527 0.117149 3.637586 4.343805 
CEO_tenure 9,635 1.657106 0.87824 0 3.526361 
CEO_chair 9,635 0.480638 0.499651 0 1 
ASSETt-1 9,635 8.664246 1.525951 4.182859 13.38219 
MTBt-1 9,635 2.013017 1.274782 0.706241 14.40553 
Leveraget-1 9,635 0.262989 0.197601 0 1.037564 
Analystt-1 9,635 2.455594 0.670889 0 3.610918 
BlockOwnt-1 9,635 0.271832 0.199034 0 1 
ROAt 9,635 0.047169 0.0845 -0.93729 0.311541 
RETt 9,635 0.107549 0.551512 -0.93364 13.42453 
EarnVol 9,635 0.036119 0.059845 0.000401 1.078681 
RetVol 9,635 0.092055 0.056506 0.023381 0.608168 










Panel B. Descriptive Statistics of Contractual Components by Fiscal Year 
Fiscal 





















    (weight in value) 
1998 2.189 1.092  0.679 0.215 0.106 0.175 0.025 0.010 0.388 0.857 0.133 0.020 
1999 2.153 1.112  0.687 0.219 0.094 0.192 0.021 0.011 0.371 0.882 0.130 0.017 
2000 2.186 1.171  0.698 0.191 0.111 0.170 0.016 0.011 0.358 0.872 0.109 0.012 
2001 2.207 1.124  0.698 0.197 0.105 0.159 0.014 0.009 0.343 0.881 0.105 0.008 
2002 2.155 1.202  0.684 0.200 0.116 0.174 0.015 0.010 0.351 0.905 0.116 0.010 
2003 2.168 1.296  0.586 0.234 0.180 0.209 0.023 0.014 0.381 0.906 0.135 0.010 
2004 2.253 1.453  0.542 0.213 0.243 0.206 0.030 0.013 0.393 0.889 0.131 0.017 
2005 2.353 1.566  0.451 0.255 0.294 0.281 0.047 0.027 0.438 0.918 0.169 0.033 
2006 2.806 2.475  0.341 0.298 0.361 0.460 0.081 0.040 0.495 0.863 0.339 0.050 
2007 3.001 2.649  0.312 0.289 0.399 0.481 0.086 0.047 0.504 0.865 0.355 0.058 
2008 3.035 2.738  0.305 0.293 0.401 0.489 0.093 0.047 0.521 0.858 0.361 0.065 
2009 3.045 2.835  0.281 0.312 0.406 0.504 0.106 0.053 0.527 0.855 0.360 0.069 
2010 3.213 2.967  0.253 0.285 0.462 0.508 0.119 0.064 0.526 0.873 0.364 0.076 
2011 3.180 3.108  0.241 0.283 0.476 0.542 0.136 0.074 0.542 0.911 0.377 0.089 
2012 3.219 3.320  0.210 0.294 0.496 0.587 0.163 0.092 0.571 0.917 0.399 0.112 
2013 3.240 3.455  0.202 0.281 0.517 0.598 0.184 0.111 0.580 0.920 0.401 0.123 
2014 3.354 3.769  0.182 0.283 0.535 0.620 0.201 0.128 0.593 0.930 0.403 0.136 
2015 3.399 3.867  0.175 0.280 0.545 0.632 0.211 0.138 0.599 0.934 0.393 0.145 
2016 3.483 3.979  0.164 0.266 0.564 0.644 0.219 0.152 0.607 0.926 0.413 0.148 
2017 3.474 3.969  0.153 0.266 0.580 0.658 0.234 0.162 0.632 0.937 0.444 0.151 
2018 3.509 4.011  0.141 0.257 0.602 0.650 0.237 0.176 0.621 0.946 0.437 0.149 
 
Panel C. Descriptive Statistics of Contractual Feature Usage by Industry 
Two-digit SIC Industry Group 












 mean median      
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 5.349 3.667 82.7 90.4 76.9 75.0 17.3 
Mining 5.917 3.915 95.9 97.6 74.7 66.8 47.9 
Construction 7.154 6.096 90.4 94.0 78.4 74.9 25.4 
Manufacturing 5.635 4.051 92.8 96.9 76.3 71.9 26.1 
Transportation & Public Utilities 5.252 3.386 93.0 96.2 80.6 73.1 42.9 
Wholesale Trade 4.668 3.329 92.3 97.4 81.0 78.3 11.1 
Retail Trade 6.220 4.246 89.9 95.5 77.2 75.2 15.8 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 5.192 3.306 91.7 95.3 74.7 68.2 29.2 










Table 3. Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables 
Note: This table presents the correlation matrix. Correlations in bold are statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) Homogeneity_md 1                   
(2) Homogeneity_ed 0.798 1                  
(3) Common_risk -0.019 -0.046 1                 
(4) Common_own 0.032 -0.007 0.218 1                
(5) Board_size 0.013 -0.005 0.112 -0.053 1               
(6) Board_ind 0.103 0.047 0.031 0.009 0.300 1              
(7) Board_busy 0.064 0.078 0.041 0.058 0.140 0.264 1             
(8) Asset -0.054 0.225 -0.084 0.331 0.050 0.571 0.234 1            
(9) MTB 0.051 -0.028 0.083 -0.164 0.055 -0.247 -0.174 -0.390 1           
(10) Leverage -0.043 0.105 -0.064 0.113 0.047 0.072 0.048 0.139 -0.187 1          
(11) Analyst 0.091 0.116 0.094 0.175 0.039 0.150 0.057 0.354 0.142 -0.164 1         
(12) BlockOwn -0.018 -0.007 0.000 0.019 0.089 -0.087 -0.055 -0.107 -0.050 0.094 -0.097 1        
(13) ROAt-1 0.023 -0.020 0.030 -0.001 0.055 -0.035 -0.071 -0.081 0.398 -0.218 0.121 -0.114 1       
(14) RETt-1 0.008 -0.012 -0.002 0.007 -0.025 -0.036 -0.006 -0.052 0.106 -0.011 -0.039 0.005 0.038 1      
(15) EarnVol 0.026 0.011 0.038 -0.037 -0.068 -0.184 -0.026 -0.260 0.112 -0.004 -0.037 0.082 -0.310 0.095 1     
(16) RetVol -0.016 -0.088 0.030 0.046 -0.103 -0.183 -0.097 -0.227 0.000 0.020 -0.088 0.098 -0.287 0.208 0.352 1    
(16) Concentration -0.024 0.001 0.014 0.169 -0.001 0.054 -0.027 -0.022 -0.025 -0.008 0.044 0.041 0.069 0.017 -0.035 0.054 1   
(18) CEO_age -0.045 -0.004 -0.042 0.076 0.024 0.118 0.040 0.152 -0.060 0.024 0.032 -0.038 0.032 -0.012 -0.089 -0.079 -0.014 1  




Table 4. Firm and Board Attributes 
Note: This table shows OLS estimates based on model (1), where the dependent variable is Homogeneity and the  
independent variables of interest are Common_risk, Common_own, Board_size, Board_ind, Board_busy, and 
Consultant. Columns (1) and (3) present the estimates for models with Homogeneity_ed as dependent variable,  
while columns (2) and (4) present the estimates for models with Homogeneity_md as dependent variable.  
All regressions include fixed year and industry effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficients and 
are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and ***, for  
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 Dependent variable: Homogeneityt 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Common_riskt-1 (+)     0.069*** (3.99) 0.101*** (2.82) 
     Common_ownt-1 (+)     0.168*** (2.74) 0.340** (2.51) 
     Board_sizet-1 (+)     0.063*** (3.61) 0.082** (2.15) 
     Board_indt-1 (+)     0.142** (2.50) 0.334*** (3.01) 
     Board_busyt-1 (+)     0.045*** (2.78) 0.090** (2.49) 
     Consultantt (+)     0.099*** (5.97) 0.159*** (4.66) 
CEO attributes:          
     CEO_aget  -0.070* (-1.85) -0.108 (-1.42) -0.069* (-1.87) -0.102 (-1.37) 
     CEO_tenuret  -0.015*** (-3.18) -0.022** (-2.23) -0.010** (-2.27) -0.014 (-1.48) 
     CEO_chairt  0.006 (0.78) 0.005 (0.28) -0.001 (-0.12) -0.008 (-0.46) 
Firm attributes:          
     ASSETt-1  -0.007* (-1.70) -0.021*** (-2.58) -0.023*** (-5.15) -0.046*** (-5.09) 
     MTBt-1  -0.005 (-1.61) -0.009 (-1.09) -0.007** (-2.01) -0.010 (-1.26) 
     Leveraget-1  0.018 (0.91) 0.026 (0.57) 0.010 (0.53) 0.010 (0.24) 
     Analystt-1  0.038*** (4.19) 0.050*** (3.07) 0.032*** (3.90) 0.042*** (2.74) 
     BlockOwnt-1  0.005 (0.31) -0.008 (-0.23) 0.006 (0.39) -0.007 (-0.19) 
     ROAt-1  -0.019 (-0.47) 0.061 (0.69) -0.015 (-0.38) 0.071 (0.83) 
     RETt-1  -0.000 (-0.01) -0.002 (-0.17) -0.001 (-0.18) -0.003 (-0.29) 
     EarnVolt-1  0.088* (1.79) 0.112 (0.98) 0.071 (1.49) 0.077 (0.68) 
     RetVolt-1  -0.111 (-1.56) -0.243* (-1.67) -0.099 (-1.43) -0.218 (-1.53) 
     Concentrationt-1  -0.103 (-0.70) 0.419 (1.59) -0.099 (-0.65) 0.427 (1.59) 
          




          
Year-fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations  9,635 9,635 9,635 9,635 
Adjusted R-squared  0.136 0.182 0.159 0.197 
Degrees of Freedom  31 31 37 37 




Table 5. CEO Compensation Homogeneity and Accounting Performance  
d 
Note: Panel A of this table shows OLS estimates based on model (2), where the dependent variables are ROA in year t, t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively.  
The independent variable of interest is Homogeneity. Odd numbered columns present the estimates for models with Homogeneity_ed as independent variable, 
while even numbered columns present the estimates for models with Homogeneity_md as independent variable.  
Panel B of this table shows OLS estimates based on model (2), where the dependent variables are RET in year t, t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively. The  
The independent variable of interest is Homogeneity. Odd numbered columns present the estimates for models with Homogeneity_ed as independent variable, 
while even numbered columns present the estimates for models with Homogeneity_md as independent variable.  
All regressions include fixed year and firm effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficients and are based on standard errors that are  
clustered by firm. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and ***, for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A. CEO Compensation Homogeneity and ROA 
 Dependent variables: 
 ROAt ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     Homogeneityt -0.001 (-0.29) 0.005** (2.03) -0.015*** (-2.92) -0.001 (-0.31) -0.015*** (-2.81) -0.003 (-0.98) -0.008 (-1.55) -0.003 (-1.27) 
     ASSETt-1 -0.019*** (-5.19) -0.018*** (-5.10) -0.027*** (-5.69) -0.026*** (-5.54) -0.027*** (-5.37) -0.026*** (-5.27) -0.024*** (-4.81) -0.024*** (-4.78) 
     MTBt-1 0.020*** (9.55) 0.020*** (9.54) 0.014*** (4.91) 0.014*** (4.90) 0.011*** (3.68) 0.011*** (3.67) 0.010*** (3.64) 0.010*** (3.63) 
     Leveraget-1 0.011 (0.98) 0.012 (1.01) 0.021 (1.63) 0.022* (1.71) 0.047*** (3.41) 0.047*** (3.45) 0.055*** (3.71) 0.055*** (3.74) 
     Analystt-1 0.002 (0.75) 0.002 (0.64) 0.002 (0.49) 0.001 (0.30) -0.002 (-0.58) -0.003 (-0.72) -0.000 (-0.02) -0.000 (-0.06) 
     BlockOwnt-1 -0.011* (-1.84) -0.011* (-1.78) -0.002 (-0.32) -0.002 (-0.28) -0.002 (-0.32) -0.002 (-0.32) 0.011 (1.55) 0.011 (1.54) 
     ROAt-1 0.227*** (8.82) 0.226*** (8.82) 0.020 (0.85) 0.021 (0.86) -0.010 (-0.44) -0.010 (-0.42) -0.027 (-1.04) -0.027 (-1.04) 
     RETt-1 0.010*** (5.15) 0.010*** (5.18) 0.007*** (3.50) 0.007*** (3.49) 0.001 (0.29) 0.001 (0.29) 0.004** (2.07) 0.004** (2.09) 
     EarnVolt-1 0.101*** (2.99) 0.099*** (2.95) 0.173*** (4.63) 0.170*** (4.56) 0.101*** (3.07) 0.100*** (3.03) 0.023 (0.72) 0.023 (0.72) 
     RetVolt-1 -0.097*** (-3.35) -0.097*** (-3.34) -0.087*** (-3.29) -0.088*** (-3.27) -0.062** (-2.43) -0.062** (-2.43) -0.071** (-2.53) -0.071** (-2.53) 
     Board_sizet-1 0.006 (0.75) 0.006 (0.71) 0.004 (0.50) 0.004 (0.47) -0.000 (-0.03) -0.000 (-0.05) 0.000 (0.03) 0.000 (0.03) 
     Board_indt-1 -0.009 (-0.45) -0.008 (-0.41) -0.027 (-1.28) -0.026 (-1.24) -0.022 (-0.91) -0.021 (-0.89) -0.018 (-0.77) -0.018 (-0.78) 
     CEO_aget 0.014 (0.83) 0.015 (0.92) 0.036* (1.66) 0.038* (1.74) 0.064*** (2.71) 0.065*** (2.75) 0.040* (1.82) 0.040* (1.82) 
     CEO_tenuret -0.000 (-0.08) -0.000 (-0.14) -0.004* (-1.95) -0.004** (-1.97) -0.006*** (-2.64) -0.006*** (-2.64) -0.003 (-1.42) -0.003 (-1.39) 
     CEO_chairt 0.007** (2.42) 0.007** (2.46) 0.008** (2.28) 0.008** (2.31) 0.004 (1.13) 0.004 (1.16) 0.002 (0.33) 0.002 (0.34) 
                 
                 
Year-fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
Observations 9,635 9,635 9,333 9,333 8,284 8,284 7,342 7,342 
Adjusted R-squared 0.480 0.481 0.417 0.416 0.416 0.415 0.409 0.409 
Degrees of Freedom 33 33 33 33 32 32 31 31 
  




Table 5. (continued) 
Panel B. CEO Compensation Homogeneity and RET 
 Dependent variables: 
 RETt RETt+1 RETtt+2 RETtt+3 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     Homogeneityt -0.036 (-1.02) -0.022 (-1.21) -0.078** (-2.30) -0.019 (-1.14) -0.108 (-1.59) -0.053 (-1.62) -0.160* (-1.90) -0.077* (-1.75) 
     ASSETt-1 -0.143*** (-6.76) -0.143*** (-6.71) -0.069*** (-3.35) -0.067*** (-3.27) -0.106** (-2.34) -0.104** (-2.31) -0.214*** (-3.53) -0.212*** (-3.49) 
     MTBt-1 -0.054*** (-4.61) -0.054*** (-4.59) -0.035*** (-4.06) -0.035*** (-4.00) -0.069*** (-3.66) -0.069*** (-3.65) -0.117*** (-5.09) -0.117*** (-5.09) 
     Leveraget-1 0.288*** (3.70) 0.289*** (3.70) 0.264*** (2.64) 0.268*** (2.68) 0.754*** (3.77) 0.758*** (3.79) 0.876*** (3.84) 0.882*** (3.87) 
     Analystt-1 -0.073*** (-3.24) -0.073*** (-3.27) -0.021 (-0.76) -0.024 (-0.87) -0.087 (-1.57) -0.089 (-1.62) -0.102 (-1.54) -0.105 (-1.59) 
     BlockOwnt-1 -0.053 (-0.86) -0.054 (-0.88) 0.111** (2.34) 0.111** (2.35) 0.287*** (3.16) 0.285*** (3.15) 0.472*** (3.44) 0.469*** (3.43) 
     ROAt-1 -0.658*** (-2.67) -0.656*** (-2.66) -0.349** (-2.35) -0.347** (-2.32) -0.267 (-0.97) -0.263 (-0.96) -0.291 (-0.92) -0.290 (-0.91) 
     RETt-1 -0.136*** (-10.07) -0.136*** (-10.06) -0.085*** (-5.62) -0.085*** (-5.59) -0.123*** (-4.38) -0.123*** (-4.36) -0.102*** (-3.61) -0.101*** (-3.58) 
     EarnVolt-1 0.074 (0.35) 0.074 (0.35) 0.137 (0.70) 0.128 (0.66) 0.353 (0.60) 0.350 (0.60) 0.475 (0.94) 0.472 (0.94) 
     RetVolt-1 1.740*** (5.40) 1.739*** (5.40) 0.009 (0.04) 0.007 (0.04) 0.078 (0.19) 0.075 (0.18) 0.599 (1.11) 0.596 (1.10) 
     Board_sizet-1 0.012 (0.19) 0.012 (0.20) 0.025 (0.52) 0.024 (0.51) 0.082 (0.85) 0.083 (0.86) 0.138 (1.07) 0.139 (1.08) 
     Board_indt-1 -0.038 (-0.24) -0.040 (-0.25) 0.023 (0.11) 0.023 (0.12) 0.142 (0.44) 0.138 (0.43) 0.228 (0.71) 0.222 (0.68) 
     CEO_aget 0.086 (0.83) 0.085 (0.83) 0.070 (0.69) 0.075 (0.75) -0.081 (-0.33) -0.081 (-0.33) -0.288 (-0.90) -0.289 (-0.90) 
     CEO_tenuret -0.014 (-1.01) -0.014 (-1.00) -0.019* (-1.70) -0.020* (-1.70) -0.026 (-0.93) -0.026 (-0.91) -0.009 (-0.23) -0.007 (-0.19) 
     CEO_chairt 0.038* (1.85) 0.038* (1.85) 0.019 (1.01) 0.020 (1.03) 0.016 (0.40) 0.016 (0.41) -0.035 (-0.62) -0.034 (-0.60) 
                 
                 
Year-fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
Observations 9,635 9,635 9,331 9,331 8,269 8,269 7,308 7,308 
Adjusted R-squared 0.188 0.188 0.177 0.177 0.184 0.184 0.259 0.259 
Degrees of Freedom 33 33 33 33 32 32 31 31 
 
 




Table 6. CEO Compensation Homogeneity and Primary Contract Attributes 
Note: This table shows OLS estimates based on model (3), where the dependent variable is Homogeneity and the  
independent variables of interest are five primary contract attributes. Column (1) presents the estimates for model 
with Homogeneity_ed as dependent variable, while column (2) presents the estimates for model with  
Homogeneity_md as dependent variable.  
Both regressions include fixed year and industry effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on  
standard errors that are clustered by firm. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, ***, for 10%, 5%, and 1%,  
respectively.  
 Dependent variable: Homogeneityt 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) 
(3) 
(4) 
     Payt  -0.010 (-1.53) -0.036*** (-2.70) 
     Award_equityt  0.344*** (24.57) 0.422*** (14.12) 
     Vest_longt  0.237*** (11.57) 0.631*** (18.56) 
     PerformanceBaset  -0.175*** (-6.47) -0.551*** (-12.00) 
     Measure_accountingt  0.202*** (8.45) 0.580*** (13.46) 
     Common_riskt-1  0.056*** (3.60) 0.083** (2.52) 
     Common_ownt-1  0.114** (2.12) 0.270** (2.18) 
     Board_sizet-1  0.052*** (3.55) 0.076** (2.24) 
     Board_indt-1  0.073 (1.61) 0.228** (2.42) 
     Board_busyt-1  0.021 (1.41) 0.057* (1.68) 
     Consultantt  0.064*** (3.91) 0.112*** (3.49) 
CEO attributes:      
     CEO_aget  -0.080*** (-2.70) -0.120* (-1.87) 
     CEO_tenuret  -0.006* (-1.65) -0.007 (-0.78) 
     CEO_chairt  0.002 (0.24) -0.002 (-0.14) 
Firm attributes:      
     ASSETt-1  -0.018*** (-4.29) -0.033*** (-3.69) 
     MTBt-1  -0.005* (-1.67) -0.006 (-0.74) 
     Leveraget-1  0.012 (0.74) 0.016 (0.41) 
     Analystt-1  0.021*** (3.09) 0.023* (1.75) 
     BlockOwnt-1  0.012 (0.84) 0.015 (0.47) 
     ROAt-1  0.002 (0.05) 0.092 (1.07) 
     RETt-1  -0.002 (-0.49) -0.004 (-0.39) 
     EarnVolt-1  0.061 (1.39) 0.065 (0.67) 
     RetVolt-1  0.002 (0.04) -0.061 (-0.49) 
     Concentrationt-1  -0.104 (-0.76) 0.478** (2.01) 
      
      
Year-fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster  Yes Yes 
      
Observations  9,635 9,635 
Adjusted R-squared  0.339 0.325 









Table 7. Structure Homogeneity of Individual Contract Components 
Note: Panel A of this table shows OLS estimates based on model (4), where the independent variables are individual 
structure homogeneity of contract components: hg_Award, hg_Vesting, hg_performance, hg_target, and hg_pay. 
The dependent variable is Homogeneity. Column (1) presents the estimates for model with main variables calculated 
using Euclidean distance of PCA, while Column (2) presents the estimates for model with main variables calculated 
using Mahalanobis distance.  
Panel B of this table shows OLS estimates based on model (1), where the dependent variables are individual  
structure homogeneity of contract components calculated with Euclidean distance of PCA. The independent 
variables are identified firm and board attributes. 
Panel C of this table shows estimates based on model (2), where the dependent variables are accounting or stock 
performance in year t, t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively. The coefficients on Controls are not tabulated in the table. 
All regressions include fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficients and are based on 
standard errors that are  
clustered by firm. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and ***, for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A. Overall Structure Homogeneity and Individual Component Structure Homogeneity 
 Dependent variable: Homogeneityt 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) 
(3) 
(4) 
     hg_Awardt  0.203*** (29.56) 0.081*** (7.17) 
     hg_Vestingt  0.182*** (24.05) 0.205*** (23.33) 
     hg_Performancet  0.208*** (29.53) 0.260*** (25.33) 
     hg_Targett  0.112*** (26.47) 0.158*** (23.35) 
     hg_Payt  0.325*** (36.59) 0.337*** (31.45) 
     Common_riskt-1  0.035 (1.21) 0.045 (0.60) 
     Common_ownt-1  0.020*** (2.69) 0.016 (0.84) 
     Board_sizet-1  0.051** (2.23) 0.148** (2.48) 
     Board_indt-1  0.037*** (5.22) 0.067*** (3.07) 
     Board_busyt-1  0.019*** (3.16) 0.039** (2.07) 
     Consultantt  -0.019 (-1.33) -0.006 (-0.15) 
CEO attributes:      
     CEO_aget  -0.005*** (-3.01) -0.004 (-0.79) 
     CEO_tenuret  -0.001 (-0.18) -0.001 (-0.10) 
     CEO_chairt  -0.001 (-0.57) -0.002 (-0.50) 
Firm attributes:      
     ASSETt-1  -0.003** (-2.22) -0.004 (-0.79) 
     MTBt-1  -0.010 (-1.22) -0.031 (-1.23) 
     Leveraget-1  0.003 (0.93) 0.004 (0.52) 
     Analystt-1  -0.008 (-1.09) -0.031 (-1.55) 
     BlockOwnt-1  -0.010 (-0.59) 0.040 (0.83) 
     ROAt-1  0.000 (0.19) -0.003 (-0.58) 
     RETt-1  0.002 (0.09) -0.023 (-0.35) 
     EarnVolt-1  -0.067** (-2.19) -0.137* (-1.78) 
     RetVolt-1  -0.223*** (-2.96) -0.259* (-1.77) 
     Concentrationt-1      
      
      
Year-fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster  Yes Yes 
      
Observations  9,635 9,635 
Adjusted R-squared  0.786 0.702 
Degrees of Freedom  41 41 
 




Table 7. (continued) 
d 
Panel B. Firm and Board Attributes 
 Dependent variables: 
 hg_Awardt hg_Vestingt hg_Performancet hg_Targett hg_Payt 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     Common_riskt-1 0.080*** (2.91) 0.062** (2.43) 0.109*** (4.24) -0.012 (-0.30) 0.041** (2.24) 
     Common_ownt-1 0.161* (1.79) 0.148* (1.82) 0.154* (1.92) -0.050 (-0.35) 0.151** (2.30) 
     Board_sizet-1 0.045* (1.74) 0.016 (0.65) 0.054** (2.43) -0.036 (-0.84) 0.072*** (3.69) 
     Board_indt-1 0.137 (1.61) 0.168* (1.86) 0.073 (0.85) -0.215* (-1.88) 0.125** (2.16) 
     Board_busyt-1 0.010 (0.38) 0.013 (0.54) -0.006 (-0.24) -0.014 (-0.34) 0.019 (1.03) 
     Consultantt 0.115*** (5.08) 0.076*** (3.33) 0.065*** (3.71) -0.166*** (-6.59) 0.147*** (6.62) 
CEO attributes: 0.009 (0.17) -0.078 (-1.53) -0.078 (-1.59) -0.048 (-0.64) -0.048 (-1.28) 
     CEO_aget -0.017** (-2.48) 0.001 (0.17) -0.003 (-0.47) -0.002 (-0.16) -0.002 (-0.45) 
     CEO_tenuret 0.010 (0.89) 0.008 (0.78) 0.001 (0.13) -0.041** (-2.21) 0.002 (0.22) 
     CEO_chairt -0.015** (-2.30) -0.006 (-1.04) -0.022*** (-3.51) -0.042*** (-3.78) -0.025*** (-5.49) 
Firm attributes: -0.004 (-0.68) 0.003 (0.71) -0.004 (-0.78) 0.021*** (2.70) -0.014*** (-4.21) 
     ASSETt-1 0.003 (0.09) -0.001 (-0.02) -0.046* (-1.72) 0.053 (1.06) 0.071*** (3.37) 
     MTBt-1 0.052*** (4.97) 0.035*** (3.44) 0.021** (2.19) -0.019 (-1.23) 0.031*** (3.29) 
     Leveraget-1 0.006 (0.25) -0.020 (-0.84) 0.022 (0.98) 0.076** (2.01) 0.011 (0.62) 
     Analystt-1 -0.055 (-0.88) -0.088 (-1.62) 0.014 (0.26) -0.016 (-0.22) 0.067 (1.61) 
     BlockOwnt-1 -0.003 (-0.51) -0.002 (-0.30) -0.000 (-0.09) -0.014 (-1.20) 0.004 (0.71) 
     ROAt-1 0.037 (0.38) 0.102 (1.23) 0.191** (2.16) 0.096 (0.95) -0.023 (-0.42) 
     RETt-1 -0.088 (-0.82) 0.107 (1.10) -0.035 (-0.33) 0.284** (1.97) -0.174** (-2.31) 
     EarnVolt-1 -0.234 (-0.81) 0.368* (1.68) 0.584** (2.21) 0.569** (2.14) -0.248* (-1.67) 
     RetVolt-1 -0.826*** (-3.23) -0.738*** (-3.28) -0.199 (-0.75) 0.607* (1.79) -1.039*** (-5.91) 
     Concentrationt-1 0.080*** (2.91) 0.062** (2.43) 0.109*** (4.24) -0.012 (-0.30) 0.041** (2.24) 
           
           



















Observations 9,635 9,635 9,635 9,635 9,635 
Adjusted R-squared 0.194 0.146 0.366 0.359 0.209 
Degrees of Freedom 37 37 37 37 37 
 




Table 7. (continued) 
d 
Panel C. Firm Performance 
 Dependent variables: 
 ROAt ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     hg_Awardt t -0.006** (-2.22) -0.004** (-2.20) -0.009** (-2.49) -0.005** (-2.23) -0.009** (-2.23) -0.004* (-1.69) -0.003 (-0.78) -0.001 (-0.48) 
     hg_Vestingt -0.002 (-0.59) -0.001 (-0.38) -0.008** (-2.01) -0.004* (-1.88) -0.010** (-2.35) -0.005** (-2.42) -0.001 (-0.21) -0.001 (-0.29) 
     hg_Performancet -0.001 (-0.20) 0.002 (0.96) -0.001 (-0.28) 0.000 (0.24) 0.000 (0.06) 0.000 (0.07) -0.001 (-0.21) -0.001 (-0.32) 
     hg_Targett -0.001 (-0.50) 0.000 (0.06) -0.001 (-0.59) 0.000 (0.11) 0.000 (0.07) 0.001 (0.59) -0.001 (-0.50) -0.000 (-0.10) 
     hg_Payt 0.010** (2.32) 0.005** (2.32) 0.004 (0.78) 0.001 (0.48) -0.002 (-0.36) -0.001 (-0.20) -0.002 (-0.34) -0.002 (-0.61) 
                 
Observations 9,635 9,635 9,333 9,333 8,284 8,284 7,342 7,342 
Adjusted R-squared 0.481 0.481 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.416 0.409 0.409 
Degrees of Freedom 37 37 37 37 36 36 35 35 
 
 Dependent variables: 
 RETt RETt+1 RETtt+2 RETtt+3 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     hg_Awardt t -0.074** (-2.56) -0.034** (-1.99) -0.022 (-0.83) -0.013 (-0.85) -0.004 (-0.08) -0.017 (-0.55) 0.009 (0.15) -0.010 (-0.27) 
     hg_Vestingt -0.018 (-0.67) -0.002 (-0.18) -0.014 (-0.64) -0.008 (-0.62) -0.036 (-0.76) -0.016 (-0.64) -0.071 (-1.26) -0.032 (-1.14) 
     hg_Performancet 0.016 (0.73) -0.007 (-0.47) -0.016 (-0.74) -0.008 (-0.57) -0.023 (-0.50) -0.010 (-0.37) -0.045 (-0.88) -0.014 (-0.39) 
     hg_Targett -0.030** (-2.35) -0.009 (-1.17) -0.021 (-1.19) -0.008 (-0.84) -0.000 (-0.02) -0.001 (-0.08) 0.003 (0.08) -0.006 (-0.28) 
     hg_Payt 0.036 (1.08) 0.012 (0.69) -0.015 (-0.55) -0.009 (-0.65) -0.095 (-1.59) -0.059* (-1.91) -0.109 (-1.32) -0.067 (-1.60) 
                 
Observations 9,635 9,635 9,331 9,331 8,269 8,269 7,308 7,308 
Adjusted R-squared 0.189 0.188 0.177 0.177 0.184 0.185 0.259 0.259 
Degrees of Freedom 37 37 37 37 36 36 35 35 
 
 
 
